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1. INTRODUCTION
[Vol. 40:559
The Schiavo case is our immediate subject. The transaction there
involved a traumatic injury to Ms. Schiavo, her husband's
immediate and subsequent responses to her condition, her prolonged
period of apparent mental dormancy, the original and repeated
judicial proceedings addressing whether to continue sustaining her
in life, and the prolonged and intense disputes over the proper
answers to those questions. l One of the eventual responses was the
extraordinary enactment by Congress of legislation granting the
federal courts jurisdiction to address the case. 2 A further response
was that of the federal courts in declining to address the merits of
the underlYing controversy, in deference to the decisions made by
the Florida state courts.3 A still further response was denunciation
by congressional critics of the proceedings, complaining in essence
that the federal courts had not been activist enough.
The scenario in the Schiavo case can be considered bizarre,
particularly the congressional denouement. But it cannot accurately
be considered unique. It is a familiar phenomenon that a case of
legal significance becomes the focus ofattention on the part not only
of the courts, but also of the public, the media, and the political
agencies of government. Consider, for example, Watergate, Enron,
Rodney King, Keating, and now Hurricane Katrina. For the record:
Watergate involved the burglary of an office in Washington, D.C.
by operatives who were later revealed to be acting at the direction
of close associates of President Nixon and, inferentially, of the
President himself.
Enron involved financial and accounting fraud in a major energy
company by corporate officials who were later revealed to have acted
more or less in concert with outside accountants and bank officers. 4
1 See Arian Campo-Flores, The Legacy ofTerri Schiavo, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4,2005, at 22
(detailing history of Terri Schiavo's legal struggle).
2 Reliefofthe Parents ofTheresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 1, 119 Stat. 15, 15
(2005).
3 See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1388 (M.D. Fla. 2005),
affd, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005) (denying parents'
request for injunctive relief).
4 See generally MIMI SWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY
OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON (2003) (describing Enron scandal).
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Rodney King involved brutalization of a black arrestee by Los
Angeles police who denied the charge, but were later shown in the
act in an amateur's video tape5-the Louima case in New York City
was somewhat similar.6
Keating involved financial manipulation and fraud in use of
funds of federally insured savings banks.7
And Hurricane Katrina involved many things, including
government officials lacking a clue about events everyone else in the
country could see on television.8
Fading memories erase some recollection of these cases, but the
list goes on: Scottsboro, referring to a racially abusive prosecution
that occurred three-quarters of a century ago;9 Ponzi scheme,
referring to a fraudulent securities scheme in the same era;lO and
watered stock, a term originally referring to the practice of
engorging cattle with water before the weigh-in at the market and
thereafter applied to accounting inflation of corporate securities. ll
Yet another example is the name "bubble," which today refers to
reckless market performance, but which originated three centuries
ago in an earlier financial market collapse. 12
II. IN LEGAL CONTEMPLATION
For members of the legal profession, cases such as Enron,
Schiavo, and Rodney King are understood as conspICUOUS
5 See Tracy Wood & Faye Fiore, Beating Victim Says He Obeyed Police, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
7,1991, at Al (detailing attack of Rodney King).
6 See Charges ofBrutality, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1997, at B9 (reporting injuries sustained
by Abner Louima).
7 See The S & L Scandal's Cruel Truths, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1989, at A24 (reporting
Charles Keating's upcoming congressional testimony).
8 See Nancy Gibbs, The Aftermath, TIME, Sept. 12, 2005, at 44 (reporting devastation in
New Orleans from Hurricane Katrina and unpreparedness of officials).
9 Douglas O. Linder, The Trials of "The Scottsboro Boys," http://www.law.umkc.eduJ
faculty/projectsIFTrials/scottsboro/SB_acct.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
10 See generally "Ponzi" Schemes, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Feb.
3, 2006) (defining term as "type of illegal pyramid scheme").
II See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1458 (8th ed. 2004) (defining term as "stock issued for
less than per value").
12 The Mississippi Bubble and the South Sea Bubble, which occurred in the early
eighteenth century, are generally considered to be among the first delusive financial schemes.
Peter M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 35,35-42 (1990).
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illustrations of traditional legal problems: Protecting integrity in
commercial and financial transactions, regulating use of force (the
Schiavo case involved the minimal force of removing a tube),
controlling impulses to invidious discrimination, and assuring fair
procedure and competence in government administration.
The legal mind wants to consider these and other legal disputes
isolated from their community roots and insulated from their
political implications. Thus, we wish to consider the Schiavo case
as presenting a general problem of the relationship between a
disabled person, the person's family, and the state. Only by
abstracting the situation in this way is it possible to disregard or
discount the idiOSYncratic "local" elements of such a case-for
example, that Mr. Schiavo had established a new intimate and
family relationship while his wife remained hospitalized in intensive
care. Framing a problem in formal legal terms also makes it
possible to repress the political implications of the Schiavo case,
such as right to life issues in other contexts like the controversy over
abortion.
Professor Thomas Reed Powell ofHarvard defined the legal mind
accordingly: "If you think that you can think about a thing
. inextricably attached to something else without thinking of the
thing which it is attached to, then you have a legal mind."13
In more prosaic terms, Professor Karl LlewellYn tried to teach
that in a tort case it was of no special relevance that the vehicle
involved was a magenta-colored Buick,14 even though every trial
lawyer and highway policeman knows that the kind of car involved
can make a difference in a subsequent legal proceeding.
Considering a situation such as the Schiavo case as a "strictly
legal" matter puts it in a zone of specially bounded and insulated
reality. That zone is above or alongside the broader reality captured
in a news report or the recollection of an ordinary observer. A
nonlegal account of the Schiavo case would include references to the
apparently unhappy Schiavo marriage and Mr. Schiavo's
subsequent domestic situation, the conflicted relationship between
13 THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 101 (1935), quoted in FRED
SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF At\1ERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 270 (1993).
14 K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 48 (Oceana 1951) (1930).
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Mr. Schiavo and his wife's parents, the medical examinations and
reports in the years of Ms. Schiavo's hospitalization, the cost of
hospitalization and Mr. Schaivo's malpractice suit and the proceeds
of its settlement, and the moral concerns of religious and activist
groups on all sides of the issues. All that information is an
ingredient of ordinary talk and gossip, and, accordingly, is relevant
to ordinary consciousness.
There are similar stories or "narratives" for all "high profile"
cases, and indeed for the low profile cases of everyday life. The
"background" information, however, is excluded as irrelevant in the
insulated zone of legal contemplation. In legal contemplation, by
the time the Schiavo case came before the federal courts, the issue,
as Judge Whittemore properly concluded, was whether the
determinations by the Florida courts were subject to invalidation
through collateral attack. I5 Also excluded from the zone would be
the various views and stances of actors in the political agencies of
government, notably those in Congress.
III. ORDINARY LIFE, PRIVATE DISPUTES
Most events and transactions in the community-at least in the
American community as most of us experience it-do not involve
disputes about how people should behave. People drive their cars
more or less carefully, and at any rate without collision; people buy
things without reading the disclaimers and warnings, and usually
are satisfied with their purchases thanks to the wonders of market
competition; most pay their bills, even if sometimes slowly; and
most treat their spouses and children with at least minimal decency.
Indeed, most people appear to live without much conscious regard
oflegal regulations, but rather are guided by ethical understandings
and simplified "rules of thumb" shared within their various
subcommunities.
15 See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382 (M.D Fla. 2005),
affd, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005) ("Whether the
Plaintiffs may bring claims in federal court is not the issue confronting the court today,
however. The issue confronting the court is whether temporary injunctive relief is
warranted.").
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Even when disputes arise in ordinary life, most people do not
respond by thinking in legal terms, 16 a pattern ofconduct that might
be called Legal Abstinence. This pattern continues to be
characteristic in contemporary society notwithstanding the "legal
explosion"-the prevalence oflegal advertising, television programs
like Judge Judy l? that romanticize the legal process, and
controversies over tort lawyers and tort reform. Most people regard
legal disputes as uncivil, lawyers as expensive, and litigation as
intensely unpleasant. 18 Hence, when confronted with a legal
dispute, most people simply "lump it," "chalk it up to experience,"
become sadder but wiser in the ways of the world, and get on with
their lives.
Thus, the pattern in the community at large is as follows: First,
general conformity to shared norms of conduct so that conflicts over
right and wrong do not arise; second, recession from overt
disputation when conflicts do arise; and, third, resort to litigation
only under exceptional circumstances. Even when resort is made to
legal process, most legal disputes do not proceed to litigation, and
most litigation does not proceed to trial. Despite folklore to the
contrary, most lawyers turn away the majority of cases-especially
litigation specialists, who turn away even more prospective
claimants.19 And most litigation is essentially encapsulated matter
among the parties and their counsel, a court clerical staff and
sometimes a trial judge, and perhaps some witnesses and interested
bystanders. Public information about the case is immured in the
judicial archives.
The result of these patterns is that the very largest number of
legal disputes-unlike Schiavo, Enron, and the other cases
discussed earlier-are of no interest to the general public, except
16 See William L.F. Felsteiner et aI., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming . .. ,15 LAW & SOC'yREV. 631, 651-52 (1980) (noting Americans'
reluctance to raise legal claims due to their celebrated individualism).
17 See generally Judge Judith Sheindlin, Presiding Judge, http://www.judgejudy.comlBios/
allaboutjudy.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2006) (detailing biography of Judge Judy).
18 Many lawyers hold the same view. See Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to
Reach the Heart ofthe Matter, in 3 LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 89, 105 (1926) ("[A]s a litigant,
I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death.").
19 See Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH.
U. L.Q. 739, 754-57 (2002) (dispelling myth that lawyers take most cases brought to them).
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perhaps for transitory local gossip. Neither are they of interest to
the media or the political branches ofgovernment. They are private,
essentially by default.
IV. HIGH PROFILE LITIGATION
Some disputes, however, burgeon into litigation, and some
litigation (a very small proportion) is amplified by public curiosity
and media attention. We should accept that public curiosity is the
primary driving force that transforms a legal dispute into "high
profile" litigation.20 A case acquires a high profile through media
reaction, which in turn reflects the media's estimate of potential
public curiosity. The media-newspapers, television, radio, and
other mediums-are selective in their attention because they cannot
cover everything. In turn, their estimates of public curiosity are
derived from the concepts of relevance shared by the ordinary
citizens who make up "the public."
Put differently, the media are especially interested in what is of
interest to their audiences, which consist primarily of ordinary
citizens. And the ordinary citizen's sense of relevance is also of
special interest to members of the political branches ofgovernment,
particularly those who hold elective office.
Most of us ordinary folk have a strong appetite for morality tales.
Listening and talking about other people's troubles-gossi~nlivens
the tedium of ordinary life and transmits practical wisdom and moral
counsel. Court proceedings have always been source material for
such gossip. In bygone eras, those proceedings in small towns were
heralded by the arrival of circuit judges and lawyers for trials and
hearings. In larger centers, the townsfolk were and are supplied
with similar material by the local newspapers providing court
coverage. From time immemorial there has been interaction among
local court proceedings, local media, and politics.
In the modern era of mass media, the speed and range of
dissemination has increased exponentially. For example, the mass
20 WILLlAlVl C. COSTOPOULOS & CHARLES R. GEROW, WORKING WITH THE MEDIA IN HIGH
PROFILE CASES 1 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigationlabaannuaJJpapers/02a.
pdf ("Sometimes the media make non-profile cases into high profile cases.").
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media within the last year transformed the murder trial of Scott
Peterson in a small California city into an international event,21 as
well as the trial of Michael Jackson. 22 Hurricane Katrina came to
the general public "live and direct" worldwide. Litigation now
competes with sitcoms as material for television. Crime, corruption,
and sexual deviance get prime coverage in the newspapers and
magazines, sometimes even in the New York Times 23 and the Wall
Street Journal. 24
Thus, the interaction in Schiavo, Enron, and similar cases-to
say nothing of the fatally delayed evacuation in Katrina-between
the event and the media, the public and the political response, is
essentially this: The event animates the immediate parties to
engage in responses that can have legal implications. These
implications involve background facts that go beyond the narrow
conception of legal relevance, which along with the legally relevant
facts implicate issues of curiosity and concern to ordinary citizens;
which stimulate media attention; which results in publicity that
may stimulate political attention. In this interaction, an event that
originally was more or less private becomes public and perhaps
political.
V. VIEWPOINT AND PRESENTATION
The accounts of the underlying transactions in local gossip, the
media, and the political and legal arenas are not the same. From an
external viewpoint, there is a major difference between large,
publicly visible events like Hurricane Katrina and an initially local
and private event like the Schiavo case. It should be remembered,
however, that even in Katrina there were private and local events
of wind and water in the individual dwellings of what turned out to
21 E.g., Chris Taylor, Peterson's Martha Defense, TIME, June 14, 2004, at 16.
22 E.g., Paul Forhi, Firm in It's Conviction There Was Too Much Doubt, WASH. POST, June
14, 2005, at AI.
23 See, e.g., Brenda Goodman, Corrupt or Victim ofLies? Trial ofFormer Mayor 3egins
in Atlanta, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at A15 (describing first day oftrial offormer city official
charged with bribery, racketeering, and fraud).
24 See, e.g., Mark Maremont, Be Very Careful What You Put in Writing-It May Add to
Jail Time, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2005, at B1 (recounting developments in case of former Tyco
International executive convicted of larceny).
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be mass victimization. Television displayed hundreds of individual
vietimizations.
The differences in the accounts about Schiavo, Enron, and even
Katrina resemble those in classic literary works, such as
Shakespeare, Rashomon,25 and a Pirandello play.26 Every observer
understands reality somewhat differently from everyone else. In
Shakespeare's Othello, for example, the portrayal of Desdemona's
conduct perceived by the audience is very different from that
reported by Iago and understood by Othello. 27 In Hamlet, the
protagonist has difficulty in his interpretation of reality, partly
because that interpretation conflicts with the version held by
others.28 Rashomon presents different versions of the same
sequence of events, each according to a different observer,29 and so
also Pirandello.30 Schiavo was understood one way by the
immediate family members and another way by political figures
concerned with the activities of the federal courts. Katrina has
already become notorious for the differences in perception. In our
legal venue, many of us remember the radical difference in public
reaction to the "not guilty" verdict in the O.J. Simpson case, where
most of the white audience was stunned and much of the black
audience was jubilant. Similarly, reactions to Enron and Katrina
ran from sadness to righteous indignation.
Difference in viewpoint is a condition not only of immediate
observers but also of the "professional observers." The professional
observers in legal matters include the lawyers, judges, and other
25 See generally RYUNOSUKE AKUTAGAAWA, RAsHOMON AND OTHER STORIES (Takashi
Kojima trans., Liveright Publishing Corp. 1999) (1952) (recounting fictional death of samuri
through many conflicting witnesses).
26 LUIGI PIRANDELLO, Six Characters in Search ofan Author, reprinted in PIRANDELLO'S
MAJOR PLAYS 65, 65-120 (1991).
27 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE, act III,
sc. iii, lines 410-62, reprinted in THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 1246, 1272 (G. Blakemore
Evans ed., 2d ed. 1997) (presenting Iago's report to Othello that Desdemona has given her
handkerchief to Cassio).
28 See William Shakespeare, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act II, sc.
ii, lines 601-04, reprinted in THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE, supra note 27, at 1183, 1207
(resorting to play-within-a-play to confirm Hamlet's belief that his uncle the king has
murdered his father).
29 See generally AKuTAGAAWA, supra note 25.
30 See generally PlRANDELLO, supra note 26.
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officers of the court in legal proceedings. In the media the
professional observers include the reportorial staff, and various
officials have that role in the political arena. The vocational
framework of each professional observer shapes their various
perceptions and interpretations. Some ofus may recall the question
put by President Kennedy to observers sent to see the situation in
Vietnam whose accounts ofthe situation were so radically different:
"Did you two gentlemen visit the same country?"31
Similar differences of interpretation pervade the subsequent
accounts that we call "news" and then those accounts called
"history." Interpretation involves transmission of information as
well as its reception. Hence, differences in viewpoint have a
counterpart in differences in presentation. Some events can be seen
with our own eyes, but most of what we know or think we know
comes in some proportion from outside information-information
supplied by someone else. As every lawyer knows, the motivations
and responsibilities of an information-source affect how the
elements of an event are chosen and presented. Indeed, as
advocates, lawyers are continually engaged in that very selection
process. Recognition of this relationship is captured in the folk
wisdom "consider the source."
Matters ofpresentation are also involved in the ordinary citizen's
life. In our ordinary lives, we are transmitters as well as receivers.
One of the most perceptive sociological propositions is concisely
contained in the title of Erving Goffman's classic, The Presentation
ofSelfin Everyday Life. 32 There is no legal structure defining what
an ordinary citizen pays attention to or how people react, as there
is for a jury. Nor is there any such structure for the news media in
a regime having a free press. But there are patterns that experts in
presentations endeavor to exploit, just as lawyers as advocates try
to do within the rules of forensic technique. In politics these
techniques are now referred to in such terms as "spin control" and
"staying on message."
31 Jonathan Alter, Looking for a Way Out, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 28, 2005, at 33.
32 ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
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Legal proceedings, public opinion, and politics all involve
relationships between reality (what originally happened or is
imminent), presentations about what happened or is expected to
happen, and receptions accorded by an audience for the
presentations. In classic analysis, these relationships were
addressed under the rubric of "Rhetoric," notably in the work of
Aristotle and Cicero. Cicero, the Roman senator of the late first
century BCE, was concerned primarily with technique, particularly
technique in addresses to a political or juridical forum. 33
Conversely, Aristotle was concerned with the logic ofrhetoric.34
The remarkable fact is that Aristotle's analysis of rhetoric
remains essentially correct, so that we can still learn from it. Ifwe
comprehend and accept his analysis, the differences among the
legal, the public, and the political versions ofevents such as Schiavo
and Enron become clearer. And perhaps less disturbing.
Aristotle's approach involves two steps. First, a distinction is
drawn between rhetoric and logic; second, an analysis is made ofthe
nature of rhetoric. The first step, distinguishing between rhetoric
and logic, parallels a distinction that runs through many of
Aristotle's works-namely, between the practitioner or active
member of a community and the philosopher. 35 In this dichotomy,
rhetoric obviously is an art of the practitioner. The distinction in
analysis of rhetoric is stated in terms ofepisteme as contrasted with
techne, the former being theoretical knowledge of the world and the
latter being practical skill in persuasion.36
Aristotle's second step is analysis of that skill or techne. As
Aristotle says, "a speech is composed of three factors-the speaker,
the subject, and the listener."37 Within this framework, there must
33 See H.C. Lawson-Tancred, Introduction to ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF RHETORIC 50-58
(H.C. Lawson-Tancred trans., Penguin Books 1991) (n.d.) (describing Cicero's approach to
rhetoric as primarily concerned with art of oratory and advocacy).
34 See id. at 56 ("Aristotle! ] ... saw the task of rhetoric not as the production of
persuasion but as the discovery of the latently persuasive in any subject.").
35 E.g., ARISTOTLE, THENICOMACHEANETHICS 5 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Books
2004) (n.d.).
36 Lawson-Tancred, supra note 33, at 15.
37 ARISTOTLE, supra note 33, at 80.
570 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:559
be three types of rhetorical speech: deliberative, forensic, and
display.38 "Forensic" argument of course refers to argument made
in litigation, involving a vantage looking backward at past events to
make judgments about "justice and injustice" concerning those
events. 39 "Deliberative" argument refers to argument made in an
assembly or other lawmaking or policymaking forum, involving a
vantage looking forward to the future and giving counsel as to
"advantage or harm" entailed in one or another course of proposed
action.40 It would include not only rhetoric presented in public, but
also argument by "those who privately advise."41 "Display"
argument refers to the projection of praise or blame on someone.42
This tripartite analysis substantially corresponds to the
difference in the contemporary scene between those presentations
and contentions in court ("forensic"), those in the legislature and
other official agencies such as the White House or a governor's
office, and those in the media and ordinary gossip. These
differences can be discerned whether the topic is a domestic
relations case such as the Schiavo matter, a business case such as
Enron, or a case of government performance such as Hurricane
Katrina.
Aristotle goes on with a subtle and illuminating discussion of
differences in the appropriate structure of argument in forensic
matters, in policy deliberation, and when presented in "display" to
an audience that Aristotle calls "spectator."43 Correlatively, he
observes distinctions among the identities and responsibilities ofthe
audiences to whom argument is addressed. Forensic argument
addresses a judge or jury, while deliberative argument addresses
someone responsible for charting a future course of events. The
audience for display argument, being merely spectators, has no
responsibility, at least none for the time being. That kind of
argument, however, expounds the nature ofvirtues , such as "justice,
38 Id. at 80-81.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 80.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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courage, restraint ... liberality, prudence and wisdom."44 In
modern terms we could call such presentations public information
or, invidiously, propaganda.
VII. CONCLUSION
The more general point to be drawn is that the purposes of a
forensic or judicial inquiry and determination are different from
those of policymaking and different also from those of public
information and discussion. As Aristotle explained long ago, these
events have different participants, who have different
responsibilities and hence different interests, and who proceed upon
different types of information. We should not be surprised that they
are indeed very different, as indeed the courts and the legal
profession have usually recognized. Perhaps we should be surprised
that the media, the public, and the legislature often do not share
that recognition.
44 ld. at 105.
